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Abstract
This paper presents a comprehensive investigation of authentication schemes for smart mobile
devices. We start by providing an overview of existing survey articles published in the recent years that
deal with security for mobile devices. Then, we give a classification of threat models in smart mobile
devices in five categories, including, identity-based attacks, eavesdropping-based attacks, combined
eavesdropping and identity-based attacks, manipulation-based attacks, and service-based attacks. This
is followed by a description of multiple existing threat models. We also provide a classification of
countermeasures into four types of categories, including, cryptographic functions, personal identifica-
tion, classification algorithms, and channel characteristics. Therefore, according to the countermeasure
characteristic used and the authentication model, we categorize the authentication schemes for smart
mobile devices in four categories, namely, 1) biometric-based authentication schemes, 2) channel-
based authentication schemes, 3) factors-based authentication schemes, and 4) ID-based authentication
schemes. In addition, we provide a taxonomy and comparison of authentication schemes for smart
mobile devices in form of tables. Finally, we identify open challenges and future research directions.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices are going to take a central role in the Internet of Things era [1]. Smart phones,
assisted from the 5G technology that provides continuous and reliable connectivity [2], will
soon be able to support applications across a wide variety of domains like homecare, healthcare,
social networks, safety, environmental monitoring, e-commerce and transportation [3]. Storage
capabilities of mobile phones increase rapidly, and phones can today generate and store large
amounts of different types of data. Modern capabilities of smart phones such as mobile payment
[4] and mobile digital signing [5] of documents can help the digitalization of both the private
and the public sector raising new security and privacy requirements [6].
As shown in Figure 1, there are two types of access to smart mobile devices during the
authentication phase, namely, 1) users accessing smart mobile devices, and 2) users accessing
remote servers via smart mobile devices. Mobile devices are protected with the use of different
methods ranging from single personal identification numbers PINs, passwords or patterns which
have been proved to be vulnerable to different kinds of attacks [7]. Moreover, it has been proven
that the main breaches that systems face today, relate to attacks that can exploit human behavior,
which cal for more sophisticated security and privacy measures [8]. Even when strong authen-
tication techniques are used during the initial access to the mobile device, there is a growing
need for continuous authentication of legitimate users through users’ physiological or behavioral
characteristics [9]. In this way, approaches, which exploit biometrics, like fingerprint recognition,
face recognition, iris recognition, retina recognition, hand recognition or even dynamic behavior
such as voice recognition, gait patterns or even keystroke dynamics, can help detect imposters
in real time [10]. Every new authentication method comes with a possible risk of low user
acceptance due to latency and increasing complexity [11].
In order to secure stored data from falling into wrong hands, cryptographic algorithms, which
are conventional methods of authenticating users and protecting communication messages in
insecure networks, can be used [2]. Only the user who possesses the correct cryptographic key
can access the encrypted content. Cryptographic algorithms can be categorized in two main
groups [12], symmetric key cryptography and public key cryptography methods, where the latter
although being more promising cannot be easily applied to short messages due to inducing big
latency [13]. In case an adversary obtains the secret key of a legitimate user, this kind of attack
is very difficult to be detected in the server side.
3To conduct the literature review, we followed the same process used in our previous work [14].
Specifically, the identification of literature for analysis in this paper was based on a keyword
search, namely, "authentication scheme", "authentication protocol", "authentication system", and
"authentication framework". By searching these keywords in academic databases such as SCO-
PUS, Web of Science, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, and ACM Digital Library, an initial set of
relevant sources were located. Firstly, only proposed authentication schemes for smart mobile
devices were collected. Secondly, each collected source was evaluated against the following
criteria: 1) reputation, 2) relevance, 3) originality, 4) date of publication (between 2007 and
2018), and 5) most influential papers in the field. The final pool of papers consists of the most
important papers in the field of mobile devices that focus on the authentication as their objective.
Our search started on 01/11/2017 and continued until the submission date of this paper. The main
contributions of this paper are:
• We discuss the existing surveys on security for smart mobile devices.
• We classify the threat models, which are considered by the authentication schemes in
smart mobile devices, into five main categories, namely, identity-based attacks, eaves-
dropping-based attacks, combined eavesdropping and identity-based attacks, manipulation-
based attacks, and service-based attacks.
• We review existing research on countermeasures and security analysis techniques in smart
mobile devices.
• We provide a taxonomy and a side-by-side comparison, in a tabular form, of the state-
of-the-art on the recent advancements towards secure and authentication schemes in smart
mobile devices with respect to countermeasure model, specific mobile device, performance,
limitations, computation complexity, and communication overhead.
• We highlight the open research challenges and discuss the possible future research directions
in the field of authentication in smart mobile devices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the existing surveys on
security for mobile devices. In Section III, we provide a classification for the threat models for
mobile devices. In Section IV, we present countermeasures used by the authentication schemes
for smart mobile devices. In Section V, we present a side-by-side comparison in a tabular form for
the current state-of-the-art of authentication schemes for mobile devices. Then, we discuss open
issues and recommendations for further research in Section VI. Finally, we draw our conclusions
4TABLE I
A SUMMARY OF RELATED SURVEY PAPERS
Ref. Threat mod-
els
Countermeasures Security
analysis
techniques
Security
Systems
Authentication
schemes
Surveyed
papers
La Polla et al. (2013) [15]
√ √
X
√
0 2004 - 2011
Khan et al. (2013) [3] X X X
√
X 2005 - 2008
Harris et al. (2014) [16] X X X
√
X 2005 - 2012
Meng et al. (2015) [9] 0
√
X 0 0 2002 - 2014
Faruki et al. (2015) [17]
√
0 X
√
X 2010 - 2014
Teh et al. (2016) [18] X 0 X 0 0 2012 - 2015
Alizadeh et al. (2016) [19] 0 0 X 0 0 2010 - 2014
Patel et al. (2016) [7] 0 X X 0 0 2010 - 2015
Gandotra et al. (2017) [20]
√
0 X
√
X 2010 - 2015
Spreitzer et al. (2017) [21]
√
0 X X X 2010 - 2016
Kunda and Chishimba (2018)
[22]
X 0 X X
√
2010 - 2018
Our work
√ √ √ √ √
2007 - 2018
√
:indicates fully supported; X: indicates not supported; 0: indicates partially supported
in Section VII.
II. EXISTING SURVEYS ON SECURITY FOR SMART MOBILE DEVICES
There are around ten survey articles published in the recent years that deal with security for
mobile devices. These survey articles are categorized as shown in Table I. La Polla et al. in [15]
presented a survey on Security for Mobile Devices. They started by describing different types of
mobile malware and tried to outline key differences between security solutions for smartphones
and traditional PCs. They also presented the threats targeting smartphones by analyzing the
different methodologies, which can be used to perform an attack in a mobile environment and
explained how these methodologies can be exploited for different purposes. Based on their
analysis, which was conducted back in 2013, the authors present security solutions, focusing
mostly on those that exploit intrusion detection systems and trusted platform technologies. In
the same year, Khan et al.in [3] performed a thorough survey on mobile devices, by considering
them not as communication devices but as personal sensing platforms. Their research focused
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Fig. 1. Types of communication for the smart mobile devices during the authentication, (a) users accessing smart mobile devices,
(b) users accessing remote servers via smart mobile devices
on two main categories, participatory and opportunistic mobile phone sensing systems. Having
that in mind, they presented the existing work in the area of security of mobile phone sensing.
They concluded that security and privacy issues need more attention while developing mobile
phone sensing systems and applications, since as mobile phones are used for social interactions,
users’ private data are vulnerable. Harris et al. [16] in their survey tried to identify all emerging
security risks that mobile device imposes on SMEs and provided a set of minimum security
recommendations that can be applied to mobile devices by the SMEs. Based on a fundamental
dilemma, whether to move to the mobile era, which results in facing higher risks and investing
6on costly security technologies, or postpone the business mobility strategy in order to protect
enterprise and customer data and information.
Focusing on Android platforms, Faruki et al. in [17] surveyed several security aspects, such as
code transformation methods, strength, and limitations of notable malware analysis and detection
methodologies. By analyzing several malware and different methods used to tackle the wide
variety of new malware, they concluded that a comprehensive evaluation framework incorporating
robust static and dynamic methods may be the solution for this emerging problem.
Since password and PINs are authentication solutions with many drawbacks, Meng et al. in [9]
conducted a thorough research on biometric-based methods for authentication on mobile phones.
Authors included in their survey article both physiological and behavioral approaches, analyzed
their feasibility of deployment on touch-enabled mobile phones, spotted attack points that exist
and their corresponding countermeasures. Based on their analysis they concluded that a hybrid
authentication mechanism that includes both multimodal biometric authentication along with
traditional PINs or password can enhance both security and usability of the system. In order to
further enhance security and privacy of mobile devices, active authentication techniques, which
constantly monitor the behavior of the user, are employed. These methods are surveyed in [7],
where a thorough analysis of their advantages and limitations is presented along with open areas
for further exploration. Using physiological and behavioral biometrics-based techniques similar
to the ones surveyed in [9] along with a continuous base and not only during initial access, but
multimodal biometrics-based fusion methods have also been found to be the most efficient in
terms of security and usability. One main issue that arises from the use of biometric characteristics
is the possible theft of them, which can be prevented with the use of template protection schemes.
A similar survey [18] that discusses touch dynamics authentication techniques for mobile devices
was published in 2016. Touch dynamics is a behavioral biometrics, which captures the way
a person interacts with a touch screen device both for static and dynamic authentication of
users. Teh et al. in [18] presented detailed implementations, experimental settings covering data
acquisition, feature extraction, and decision-making techniques.
Alizadeh et al. in [19] discussed authentication issues in mobile cloud computing (MCC) and
compare it with that of cloud computing. They presented both Cloud-side and user authenti-
cation methods and spotted important that parameters that are important for designing modern
authentication systems for MCC in terms of security, robustness, privacy, usability, efficiency,
and adaptability. In another survey article that was published in 2017 [21], Spreitzer et al. focused
7on side-channel attacks against mobile devices and briefly discussed other attacks that have been
applied in the smart card or desktop/cloud setting, since the interconnectivity of these systems
makes smart phones vulnerable to them as well. Authors concluded that most of the attacks target
Android devices, due to the big market share of Android platforms. They also recommended that
future research should focus on wearables, e.g. smart watches, that may suffer from the same
attacks in the near future, and pointed out that side-channel attacks can be combined with other
attacks that exploit software vulnerabilities in order to be more efficient.
Aslam et al. in [23] reviewed authentication protocols to access the Telecare Medical Infor-
mation Systems and discussed their strengths and weaknesses in terms of ensured security and
privacy properties, and computation cost. The schemes are divided into three broad categories of
one-factor, two-factor, and three-factor authentication schemes. Velasquez et al. in [24] presented
existing authentication techniques and methods in order to discern the most effective ones for
different contexts. In [24], Kilinc and Yanik reviewed and evaluated several SIP authentication
and key agreement protocols according to their performance and security features. Finally in the
last survey article, which was published in 2017 [20], Gandotra et al. surveyed device-to-device
(D2D) communications along with security issues with the primary scope on jamming attacks.
From the above survey articles, only five of them deal with authentication schemes for mobile
devices and none of them thoroughly covers the authentication aspects that are related to mobile
devices. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first one that thoroughly covers the
aspects of: threat models, countermeasures, security analysis techniques, security systems, and
authentication schemes that were recently proposed by the research community.
III. THREAT MODELS
In this section, we present and discuss the threat models that are considered by the authen-
tication protocols in smart mobile devices. A summary of 26 attacks are classified into the
following five main categories: identity-based attacks, eavesdropping-based attacks, Combined
eavesdropping and identity-based attacks, manipulation-based attacks, and service-based attacks,
as presented in Figure 2.
A. Identity-based attacks
The attacks under this category forge identities to masquerade as authorized users, in order
to get access to the system. We classify 6 attacks, namely: Deposit-key attack, Impostor attack,
8Threat models
Identity-
based attacks
Eavesdropping-
based attacks
Combined
eavesdropping
and identity-
based attacks
Manipulation-
based attacks
Service-
based attacks
Deposit-key
attack [25]
Impostor attack [26]
Impersonation
attack [12, 27–33]
Spoofing attack [27,
33–36]
Masquerade
attack [34, 37]
Replay attack [12,
13, 25, 28, 29, 31–
33, 35, 37–40]
Eavesdropping
attack [40]
Adaptively chosen
message attack [41]
Tracing attack [42]
Offline dictionary
attack [33]
Outsider attack [12]
Brute force attack
Side-Channel
attack [13]
Known-key
attack [35]
Shoulder surfing and
reflections [43]
Reflection attack [27,
35]
Guessing attack [12,
29, 32, 38]
ID attack [30, 42, 44]
Malicious user attack
Parallel session attack
Stolen-verifier attack
Man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack [13,
26, 35, 39, 45, 46]
Forgery attack [27,
39, 40]
Trojan horse
attack [13]
Biometric template
attack [13]
DDoS/DoS attack [25,
27, 32, 35]
Fig. 2. Classification of threat models in smart mobile devices
Impersonation attack, Spoofing attack, Masquerade attack, and Replay attack.
• Deposit-key attack: It involves three parties: a roaming user, the user’s home server, and the
visiting foreign server of the roaming user. Under this attack, a malicious server makes the
visiting foreign server believes that it is the user’s home server. The roaming user deposits
information at the visiting foreign server, which is also accessible by the user’s fake home
server (i.e., malicious server). In [25], this attack can be detected by verifying the key of
foreign servers, the user can know that the foreign server does not think that its home server
9is the malicious server.
• Impostor attack: An adversary disables one of the co-located devices and attempts to
impersonate it. To thwart this attack, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange is extended with a
co-location verification stage to ensure that the pairing takes place between two co-located
devices [26].
• Impersonation attack: An adversary tries to masquerade as a legitimate to log into the
server. As presented in Figure 2, there are eight authentication protocols [12, 27–33] that
are resilient against this attack, and which use different ideas. The idea of chaotic hash-
based fingerprint biometric is used in [27]. The idea of asymmetric encryption function
is used by [28]. The idea of Elliptic curve cryptosystem is used in protocols [12, 29]. In
addition, [30] uses bilinear pairings, [31] is based on an initial random seed number that is
generated by the authorization authority. [32] and [33] adopt techniques based on Hashing
functions and self-certified public keys respectively.
• Spoofing attack: An adversary masquerades as a legal server to cheat a remote user. As
shown in in Figure 2, there are 5 authentication protocols [27, 33–36], which are proposed
to prevent and detect this attack. The idea of mutual authentication is used in protocols
[27, 33, 34]. [35] is based on Key-hash based fingerprint remote authentication scheme.
Besides, the pattern recognition approaches are adopted in [36].
• Masquerade attack: An adversary may try to masquerade as a legitimate user to communicate
with the valid system or a legitimate user. [37] uses the idea of ransom values. An adversary
cannot fabricate a fake request authentication message as it does not know the random value
of a legitimate user and hence cannot masquerade as that user. On the other hand, the idea
of mutual authentication is used in [34].
• Replay attack: It consists of spoofing the identities of two parties, intercepting data packets,
and relaying them to their destinations without modification. As shown in Figure 2, there
are 13 authentication protocols [12, 13, 25, 28, 29, 31–33, 35, 37–40] to deal with this
attack. The idea of using signatures during the authentication phase is proposed in [28].
The idea of using different nonce variables in each login is adopted by protocols in [32, 33].
Protocols in [12, 13, 25, 29, 31, 38] use the idea of timestamps, which is combined with a
randomly chosen secret key in protocols [39, 40]. On the other hand, [37] proposes a one-
way hashing function and random values, and [35] proposes random nonce and three-way
challenge-response handshake technique.
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B. Eavesdropping-based attacks
This category of attacks is based on eavesdropping the communication channel between the
user and the server in order to get some secret information and compromise the confidentiality
of the system. We can list the following attacks under this category:
• Eavesdropping attack: An attacker secretly overhears information that is transmitted over
the communication channel, and which might not be authorized to know. The protocol in
[28] deals with this attack by using the one-way hash function. On the other hand, the
protocol in [40] uses encryption with the pairwise master key.
• Adaptively chosen message attack: Under this attack, an adversary attempts to forge a valid
signature with the help of the private key generator (PKG). The objective of this attack is
to gradually reveal information about an encrypted message or about the decryption key. To
do so, ciphertexts are modified in specific ways to predict the decryption of that message.
The protocol in [41] can resist against this attack as it uses a certificateless signature.
• Tracing attack: An adversary aims to collect enough privacy information to link data to
a particular real identity. To resistant against this attack, [42] uses random numbers in
commitments and proofs.
• Offline dictionary attack: An attacker collect useful information from the insecure channel or
from the lost smart card. After that, he stores them locally and then uses them to generate a
guessed password to verify the correctness of his guess. To thwart this attack, [33] employs
the password salting mechanism.
• Outsider attack: An adversary uses the overhead messages that are exchanged between user
and server, in order to compute the secret key of the server. This attack is prevented in [12]
by using the elliptic curve cryptosystem.
• Brute force attack: It consists of generating a large number of consecutive guessed pass-
words, with the hope of eventually guessing correctly. The resiliency against this attack is
strengthened by employing the cryptographic hash function SHA-224.
• Side-Channel attack: It is based on information gained from the physical implementation
of the cryptosystem. The physical electronic systems produce emissions about their internal
process, which means that attackers can gather and extract cryptographic information. To
resist against this attack, [13] proposes deploying elliptic curve cryptosystem as well as a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
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• Known-key attack: It consists of compromising past session keys in order to derive any
further session keys. In [35], the values that are used to compute the session keys are not
available in plaintext. In addition, random nonce imparts dynamic nature to the session key,
and hence the attacker cannot predict the value of the random nonce of the future session
key.
• Shoulder surfing and reflections: It is a social engineering technique used to obtain infor-
mation such passwords and other confidential data by looking over the victim’s shoulder.
To prevent this attack, [43] uses the idea of sightless two-factor authentication.
• Reflection attack: It is applicable to authentication schemes that adopt challenge-response
technique for mutual authentication. Under this attack, a victim is tricked to provide the
response to its own challenge. To deal with this attack, [27] proposes the chaotic hash-based
fingerprint biometric remote user authentication scheme, and [35] proposes the key-hash
based fingerprint remote authentication scheme.
• Guessing attack: This attack is possible when an adversary gets a copy of the encrypted
password from the communication channel or from the smart card. Then, the adversary
guesses thousands of passwords per second and matches them with the captured one until
the guessing operation succeeds. To deal with this attack, protocols [12, 29, 32, 38] use the
elliptic curve cryptosystem.
• ID attack: An adversary sends some identities to obtain the private key of the corresponding
identity. The security against this attack is ensured in [30, 42, 44] by using the idea of
bilinear pairings.
C. Combined Eavesdropping and identity-based attacks
This category of attacks combines the eavesdropping and identity-based techniques to com-
promise the system. Under this category, we can find the following attacks:
• Malicious user attack: An attacker by extracting the credentials stored in the smart card,
he can easily derive the secret information of the system. After that, he masquerades as a
legitimate user and accesses the system.
• Parallel session attack: This attack takes place under the assumption that multiple concurrent
sessions are allowed between two communicating parties. An attacker that eavesdrops
over an insecure channel and captures login authentication message from the user and
12
the responding authentication message from the server, can create and send a new login
message to the server, and masquerading as the user.
• Stolen-verifier attack: The attacker steals the verification data from the server of a current or
past successful authentication session. Then, it uses the stolen data to generate authentication
messages and send them to the server. If the server accepts the authentication messages,
the adversary masquerades as a legitimate user.
D. Manipulation-based attacks
A data manipulation attack typically involves an unauthorized party accessing and changing
your sensitive data, rather than simply stealing it or encrypting your data and holding it for
ransom.
• Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack: An attacker by spoofing the identities of two parties
can secretly relay and even modify the communication between these parties, which believe
they are communicating directly, but in fact, the whole conversation is under the control
of the attacker. [35] proposes the key-hash based fingerprint remote authentication scheme
to secure the system against this attack. In [26], Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a co-
location verification stage is proposed. [39] combines bilinear pairing and elliptic curve
cryptography. On the other hand, [13] uses the idea of combining biometric fingerprint and
the ECC public key cryptography, whereas symmetric encryption and message authentication
code are used in [45]. The Multi factors-based authentication scheme is adopted in [46].
• Forgery attack: It forges valid authentication messages to satisfy the requirement of the
authentication scheme. To resist against this attack, [27] proposes the chaotic hash-based
fingerprint biometric remote user authentication scheme. On the other hand, [39, 40] uses
the idea of pairing and elliptic curve cryptography.
• Trojan horse attack: It uses a Trojan horse program to compromise the authentication system.
In order to prevent that the Trojan horse program tampers with the biometric authentication
module, [13] seamlessly integrates biometric and cryptography.
• Biometric template attack: An adversary attacks the biometric template in the database to
add, modify, and delete templates in order to gain illegitimate access to the system. To
increase the security strength of the biometric template, [13] maximizes its randomness.
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Cryptographic
functions
Personal
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Classification
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Channel
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Asymmetric
encryption function
Symmetric encryption
function
Hash function
Numbers-based
countermeasures
Biometrics-based
countermeasures
Logistic regression
Naive bayes classifier
Decision trees
Boosted trees
Random forest
Neural networks
Nearest neighbor
Fig. 3. Categorization of countermeasures used by the authentication schemes for smart mobile devices
E. Service-based attacks
The goal of service-based, or Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, is to make the authentication
service unavailable either by (1) flooding the authentication server with huge amount of data
to make it busy and unable of providing service to the legitimate users, or (2) updating the
verification information of a legitimate user with false data. Afterward, a legitimate legal user
is unable to login to the server. As depicted in Figure 2, there are four authentication protocols
[25, 27, 32, 35] to prevent or detect DoS attacks. In [27], the user has to perform authentication
by using a biometric fingerprint. If the mobile device is stolen or lost, illegitimate users cannot
make a new password, and hence [27] is resistant against the denial-of-service attack. As for
protocol in [25], it is only required that the user and the foreign server to be involved in each
run of the protocol, and the home server can be off-line. Consequently, DoS attack on home
servers is not possible. On the other hand, [32] uses the idea of one-way hash function, and [35]
proposes a key-hash based fingerprint remote authentication scheme.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES AND SECURITY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
A secure and efficient authentication scheme is needed to prevent various insider and outsider
attacks on many different smart mobile devices. The authentication scheme uses both cryptosys-
tems and non-cryptosystem countermeasures to perform the user authentication whenever a user
14
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Fig. 4. Personal identification-based countermeasures used by the authentication schemes for smart mobile devices
Security analysis techniques
Computational
assumptions
[30, 39, 44, 70]
Pattern recognition
approaches
[36, 40, 48, 58–
60, 65, 66]
Formal proof
[45]
Random
oracle model
[30, 44, 45]
Game theory
[41]
Fig. 5. Categorization of security analysis techniques used by the authentication schemes for smart mobile devices
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accesses the devices. In this section, we will discuss the countermeasures and security analysis
techniques used by the authentication schemes for smart mobile devices.
A. Countermeasures
The countermeasures used by the authentication schemes for smart mobile devices can be
classified into four categories, including, cryptographic functions, personal identification, classi-
fication algorithms, and channel characteristics, as presented in Figure 3. Table II presents the
countermeasures used in authentication schemes for smart mobile devices.
1) Cryptographic functions: The cryptographic functions are used in most authentication
schemes for smart mobile devices in order to achieve the security goals, which can be classified
into three types of categories, including, asymmetric encryption function, symmetric encryption
function and, hash function. As presented in Table II, two cryptographic functions are the most
used, namely, 1) Bilinear pairings and 2) Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC). The authentication
schemes [12], [29], [39], [38], [13], [72], [73] use the elliptic curve cryptosystem [80] to reduce
the computation loads for mobile devices but they still suffer from some disadvantages such as
the need for a key authentication center to maintain the certificates for users’ public keys. Using
ECC, the scheme [12] provides mutual authentication and supports a session key agreement
between the user and the server. The scheme [39] employs ECC and pairing to manipulate
authentication parameters and authorization keys for the multiple requests in mobile pay-TV
systems. The scheme [38] uses ECC with three-way challenge-response handshake technique in
order to provide the agreement of session key and the leaked key revocation capability. Note that
hash functions are used specifically to preserve the data integrity. Therefore, in this subsection,
we will briefly introduce the bilinear pairings and the elliptic curve cryptosystem.
a) Bilinear pairings: Le G1 and G2 be multiplicative groups of the same prime order p,
respectively. Let g denote a random generator of G1and e :G1×G1→G2 denote a bilinear map
constructed by modified Weil or Tate pairing with following properties:
• Bilinear: e
(
ga,gb
)
= e(g,g)ab, ∀g ∈G1 and ∀a, b ∈ Z∗p. In particular, Z∗p = {x |1 ≤ x ≤ p−1}.
• Non-degenerate: ∃g ∈ G1 such that e(g,g) , 1.
• Computable: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(g,g), ∀g ∈ G1.
b) Elliptic curve cryptosystem: As discussed by Guo et al. [42], the bilinear pairing op-
erations are performed on elliptic curves. An elliptic curve is a cubic equation of the form
y2+ axy+ by = x3+ cx2+ dx+ e, where a, b, c, d, and e are real numbers. In an elliptic curve
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cryptosystem (ECC) [80], the elliptic curve equation is defined as the form of Ep (a,b) : y2 =
x3+ax+b(mod p) over a prime finite field F, where a, b ∈ Fp, p > 3, and 4a3+27b2 , 0 (mod p).
Given an integer s ∈ F∗p and a point P ∈ Ep(a,b), the point multiplication s ·P over Ep(a,b) can be
defined as s ·P = P+P+ · · ·+P (s times). Generally, the security of ECC relies on the difficulties
of the following problems [12]:
Definition 1. Given two points P and Q over Ep(a,b), the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP) is to find an integer s ∈ F∗p such that Q = s ·P.
Definition 2. Given three points P, s ·P, and t ·P over Ep(a,b) for s, t ∈ F∗p , the computational
Diffie-Hellman problem (CDLP) is to find the point (s ·P) ·P over Ep(a,b).
Definition 3. Given two points P and Q = s · P+ t · P over Ep(a,b) for s, t ∈ F∗p , the elliptic
curve factorization problem (ECFP) is to find two points s ·P and t ·P over Ep(a,b).
2) Personal identification: As shown in Figure 4, the personal identification can be classified
into two types of categories, including:
a) Numbers-based countermeasures: (e.g, Personal Identification Number (PIN), Interna-
tional Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), and Password). Using the inter-keystroke latency, the
Clarke and Furnell’s scheme [47] classifies the users based upon entering telephone numbers
and PINs, where the users are authenticated based upon three interaction scenarios: 1) Entry of
11-digit telephone numbers, 2) Entry of 4-digit PINs, and 3) Entry of text messages. Similar
to the scheme [47], Clarke and Furnell’s framework collects the following input data types,
1) Telephone numbers, 2) Telephone area code (5-Digit), 3) Text message, and ) 4-Digit PIN
code. According to Wiedenbeck et al. [81], the numbers-based countermeasures should be easy
to remember; they should be random and hard to guess; they should be changed frequently,
and should be different for different user’s accounts; they should not be written down or stored
in plain text. Therefore, the numbers-based countermeasures are vulnerable to various types of
attacks such as shoulder surfing.
b) Biometrics-based countermeasures: are any human physiological (e.g., face, eyes, fingerprints-
palm, or ECG) or behavioral (e.g., signature, voice, gait, or keystroke) patterns. As the PIN codes
impede convenience and ease of access, the biometrics-based countermeasures are more popular
today compared to the numbers-based countermeasures. Some recent smart mobile devices (e.g.,
iPhone 5S and up and Samsung Galaxy S5 and up) have started to integrate capacitive fingerprint
scanners as part of the enclosure. As shown in Figure 4, we found 12 types of biometrics used
as a countermeasure of authentication. Khamis et al. [78] used the Gaze gestures for shoulder-
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surfing resistant user authentication on smart mobile devices. Therefore, Arteaga-Falconi et al.
[51] and Kang et al. [52] used the electrocardiogram for biometrics authentication based on
cross-correlation of the templates extracted. By recognizing the user’s voice through the mic,
Jeong et al. [46] used the voice recognition for user authentication in mobile cloud service
architecture. From images captured by the front-facing cameras of smart mobile devices, Mahbub
et al. [67] used the face recognition for continuous authentication. Based on the behavior of
performing certain actions on the touch screens, Shahzad et al. [79] proposed the idea of using
Gestures and Signatures to authenticate users on touch screen devices. Using gait captured from
inertial sensors, Hoang et al. [55] proposed the Gait recognition with fuzzy commitment scheme
for authentication systems. Based on the way and rhythm, in which the users interacts with a
keyboard or keypad when typing characters, Kambourakis et al. [64] introduced the Keystroke
dynamics for user authentication in smart mobile devices. In addition, Galdi et al. [36] introduced
an authentication scheme using iris recognition and demonstrated its applicability on smart
mobile devices. Finally, based on the idea that the instinctive gesture of responding to a phone
call can be used to capture two different biometrics, Abate et al. [50] used the ear and arm
gesture for user authentication in smart mobile devices.
B. Security analysis techniques
To prove the feasibility of authentication schemes for smart mobile devices in practice,
researchers in the security field use the security analysis techniques [82],[83], which can be
categorized into five types, namely, computational assumptions, pattern recognition approaches,
formal proof, random oracle model, and game theory, as shown in Figure5. Therefore, authen-
tication schemes for smart mobile devices that use security analysis techniques are summarized
in TableIII. Note that the pattern recognition approaches are used especially by biometric-based
authentication schemes. More precisely, Clarke and Furnell [48] used the pattern recognition
approaches to evaluating the feasibility of utilizing keystroke information in classifying users.
Kim and Hong [65] evaluated the feasibility of utilizing together teeth image and voice in terms
of the training time per model and authentication time per image. Through the Sensor Pattern
Noise (SPN), Galdi et al. showed that the sensor pattern noise-based technique can be reliably
applied on smartphones. Therefore, Wu and Tseng [30] used the random oracle model and
computational assumptions to show that the proposed scheme is secure against ID attack and
an adversary should not know the previous session keys. Finally, Liu et al. [41] used the game
18
theory to prove that the authentication scheme achieves anonymity, unlinkability, immunity of
key-escrow, and mutual authentication.
V. AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES FOR SMART MOBILE DEVICES
Generally, the classification of authentication schemes frequently mentioned in the literature is
done using the following three types, namely, Something-You-Know (can be shared and forgot-
ten), Something-You-Have (can be shared and duplicated), and Someone-You-Are (not possible
to share and repudiate), as discussed by Chen et al. in [9, 56]. In our work, according to the
countermeasure characteristic used and the authentication model, we categorize the authentication
schemes for smart mobile devices in four categories, namely, 1) Biometric-based authentication
schemes, 2) Channel-based authentication schemes, 3) Factor-based authentication schemes, and
4) ID-based authentication schemes, as shown in Figure 6.
A. Biometric-based authentication schemes
The surveyed papers of biometric-based authentication schemes for smart mobile devices
are shown in Table V. As shown in Figure 7, the realization processes of a biometric-based
authentication scheme for smart mobile devices are based on the following processes:
• Definition of authentication model (anonymous authentication, transitive authentication,
active authentication, multimodal authentication, etc.)
• Definition of attacks model (DoS attack, Deposit-key attack, impostor attack, MMITM
attack, etc.)
• Selection of countermeasures (cryptographic functions, personal identification, classification
algorithms, channel characteristics, etc.)
• Proposition of main phases of the scheme (biometric acquisition, extraction of matching,
fusion rules, decision stage, etc.)
• Security analysis techniques (computational assumptions, pattern recognition approaches,
formal proof, random oracle model, game theory, etc.)
• Performance evaluation (true acceptance rate, false acceptance rate, false rejection rate,
equal error rate, etc.)
The write a text message using a biometric is called keystroke analysis, which can be classified
as either static or continuous. To authenticate users based on the keystroke analysis, Clarke and
Furnell [47] introduced the concept of advanced user authentication, which is based on three
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Fig. 6. Categorization of authentication schemes for smart mobile devices
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Fig. 7. Flowcharts depicting the process for (a) authentication using the biometrics-based countermeasures and (b) realization
processes of an authentication scheme for smart mobile devices
interaction scenarios, namely, 1) Entry of 11-digit telephone numbers, 2) Entry of 4-digit PINs,
and 3) Entry of text messages. The scheme [47] can provide not only transparent authentication
of the user and continuous or periodic authentication of the user, but it is also efficient in terms of
the false rejection rate and false acceptance rate under three type of mobile devices, namely, Sony
Ericsson T68, HP IPAQ H5550, and Sony Clie PEG NZ90. To demonstrate the ability of neural
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network classifiers, the same authors in [48] proposed an authentication framework based on
mobile handset keypads in order to support keystroke analysis. The three pattern recognition
approaches used in this framework are, 1) Feed-forward multi-layered perceptron network,
2) Radial basis function network, and 3) Generalised regression neural network. Therefore,
Maiorana et al. [61] proved that it is feasible to employ keystroke dynamics on mobile phones
with the statistical classifier for keystroke recognition in order to employ it as a password
hardening mechanism. In addition, the combination of time features and pressure features is
proved by Tasia et al. in [63] that is the best one for authenticating users.
The passwords have been widely used by the remote authentication schemes, which they
can be easily guessed, hacked, and cracked. However, to overcome the drawbacks of only-
password-based remote authentication, Khan et al. [27] proposed the concept of the chaotic
hash-based fingerprint biometrics remote user authentication scheme. Theoretically, the scheme
[27] can prevent from fives attacks, namely, parallel session attack, reflection attack, Forgery
attack, impersonation attack, DoS attack, and server spoofing attack, but it is not tested on mobile
devices and vulnerable to biometric template attacks. To avoid the biometric template attack, Xi
et al. [13] proposed an idea based on the transformation of the locally matched fuzzy vault index
to the central server for biometric authentication using the public key infrastructure. Compared
to [34], [27], and [13], Chen et al. [32] proposed an idea that uses only hashing functions on
fingerprint biometric remote authentication scheme to solve the asynchronous problem on mobile
devices.
The biometric keys have some advantages, namely, 1) cannot be lost or forgotten, 2) very
difficult to copy or share, 3) extremely hard to forge or distribute, and 4) cannot be guessed
easily. In 2010, Li and Hwang [37] proposed a biometric-based remote user authentication scheme
using smart cards, in order to provide the non-repudiation. Without storing password tables and
identity tables in the system, Li and Hwang’s scheme [37] can resist masquerading attacks,
replay attacks, and parallel session attacks. Therefore, the authors did not specify the application
environment of their scheme, but it can be applied to smart mobile devices as the network
model is not complicated. Note that Li and Hwang’s scheme was cryptanalyzed several times.
The question we ask here: is it possible to use a graphical password as an implicit password
authentication system to avoid the screen-dump attacks? Almuairfi et al. [74] in 2013, introduced
an image-based implicit password authentication system, named IPAS, which is based on creating
a visualized image of a user’s logged answers.
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The touch dynamics for user authentication are initialed on desktop machines and finger
identification. In 2012, Meng et al. [58] focused on a user behavioral biometric, namely touch
dynamics such as touch duration and touch direction. Specifically, they proposed an authentica-
tion scheme that uses touch dynamics on touchscreen mobile phones. To classify users, Meng et
al.’s scheme use known machine learning algorithms (e.g., Naive Bayes, decision tree) under an
experiment with 20 users using Android touchscreen phones. Through simulations, the results
show that Meng et al.’s scheme reduces the average error rate down to 2.92% (FAR of 2.5%
and FRR of 3.34%). The question we ask here: is it possible to use the multi-touch as an
authentication mechanism? Sae-Bae et al. [59] in 2012, introduced an authentication approach
based on multi-touch gestures using an application on the iPad with version 3.2 of iOS. Compared
with Meng et al.’s scheme [58], Sae-Bae et al.’s approach is efficient with 10% EER on average
for single gestures, and 5% EER on average for double gestures. Similar to Sae-Bae et al.’s
approach [59], Feng et al. [60] designed a multi-touch gesture-based continuous authentication
scheme, named FAST, that incurs FAR=4.66% and FRR= 0.13% for the continuous post-login
user authentication. In addition, the FAST scheme can provide a good post-login access security,
without disturbing the honest mobile users, but the threat model is very limited and privacy-
preserving is not considered.
In 2016, Arteaga-Falconi et al. [51] introduced the concept of electrocardiogram-based authen-
tication for mobile devices. Specifically, the authors considered five factors, namely, the number
of electrodes, the quality of mobile ECG sensors, the time required to gain access to the phone,
FAR, and TAR. Before applying the ECG authentication algorithm, the preprocessing stages
for the ECG signal pass by the fiducial point detection. The ECG authentication algorithms
are based on two aspects: 1) the use of feature-specific percentage of tolerance and 2) the
adoption of a hierarchical validation scheme. The results reveal that the algorithm [51] has
1.41% false acceptance rate and 81.82% true acceptance rate with 4s of signal acquisition. Note
that the ECG signals from mobile devices can be corrupted by noise as a result of movement
and signal acquisition type, as discussed by Kang et al. [52]. However, the advantage of using
ECG authentication is concealing the biometric features during authentication, but it is a serious
problem if the privacy-preserving is not considered.
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B. Channel-based authentication schemes
The surveyed papers of channel-based authentication schemes for smart mobile devices are
shown in Table VI. From dynamic characteristics of radio environment, Varshavsky et al. [26]
showed that is possible to securely pair devices using the proximity-based authentication. Specif-
ically, the authors proposed a technique to authenticate co-located devices, named, Amigo. The
Amigo scheme uses the knowledge of the shared radio environment of devices as proof of
physical proximity, which is specific to a particular location and time. Using the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange with verification of device co-location, the Amigo scheme does not require user
involvement to verify the validity of the authentication and can detect and avoid the eavesdropping
attacks such as the impostor attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. By exploiting physical
layer characteristics unique to a body area network, Shi et al. [75] proposed a lightweight body
area network authentication scheme, named BANA. Based on distinct received signal strength
variations, the BANA scheme adopts clustering analysis to differentiate the signals from an
attacker and a legitimate node. The advantage of BANA scheme is that it can accurately identify
multiple attackers with the minimal amount of overhead.
As discussed by the work in [28], supporting group decisions and especially the electronic
voting (e-voting) has become an important topic in the field of mobile applications, where the
smart mobile devices can be used to make group decisions electronically. To secure e-voting
system, Li et al. [28] proposed that an electronic voting protocol with deniable authentication
should satisfy the following requirements: completeness, uniqueness, privacy, eligibility, fairness,
verifiability, mobility, and deniable authentication. Based on three types of cryptography, namely,
1) asymmetric encryption function, 2) symmetric encryption function, and 3) hash function, the
scheme [28] can meet these requirements of a secure e-voting system for application over mobile
ad hoc networks. Theoretically, the scheme [28] can prevent four passive and active attacks,
namely, man-in-the-middle attack, impersonation attack, replay attack, and eavesdropping attack,
but many assumptions needed to understand the implementation in a smart mobile device.
A roaming scenario in wireless networks involves four parties, namely, a roaming user, a
visiting foreign server, a home server, and a subscriber. However, He et al. [25] introduced a
user authentication scheme with privacy-preserving, named Priauth, for seamless roaming over
wireless networks. Based on probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, the Priauth scheme can
satisfy the six requirements: (1) server authentication, (2) subscription validation, (3) provision of
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user revocation mechanism, (4) key establishment, (5) user anonymity, and (6) user untraceability,
but the complexity is high when the Priauth scheme authenticates multiple handheld devices
in ad-hoc environment. Using a temporary confidential channel, Chen et al. [45] proposed a
bipartite and a tripartite authentication protocol to allow multiple handheld devices to establish a
conference key securely, which can reduce the bottleneck of running time human’s involvements.
To provide continuous secure services for mobile clients, it is necessary to design an efficient
handover protocol that achieves the handover authentication with user anonymity and untrace-
ability, as discussed in the work [40]. Specifically, Yang et al. use the identity-based elliptic
curve algorithm for supporting user anonymity and untraceability in mobile cloud computing.
To provide the active authentication on mobile devices, Samangouei et al. [88] introduced the
concept of facial attributes.
C. Factor-based authentication schemes
The surveyed papers of factor-based authentication schemes for smart mobile devices are
shown in Table VII. As shown in Figure 8, factor-based authentication can be classified into
three types of categories, including, two-factor authentication, three-factor authentication, and
multi-factor authentication.
Kim and Hong [65] proposed a multimodal biometric authentication approach using teeth
image and voice. Specifically, this approach is based on two phases, namely, 1) teeth authentica-
tion phase and 2) voice authentication phase. The teeth authentication phase uses the AdaBoost
algorithm based on Haar-like features for teeth region detection, and the embedded hidden
Markov model with the two-dimensional discrete cosine transform. The voice authentication
phase uses mel-frequency cepstral coefficients and pitch as voice features. Through performance
evolution, the approach was shown that it is better than the performance obtained using teeth or
voice individually, but the threat model is not defined. The question we ask here: is it sufficient to
use an authentication approach without defining the threat models? Park et al. [34] showed that
various attack routes in smart mobile devices may cause serious problems of privacy infringement
in data protection. Specifically, using cryptographic methods, the authors designed a combined
authentication and multilevel access control, named CAMAC. The CAMAC control uses three
types of classification of information level, namely, 1) Public, which is not sensitive and can
be disclosed in public, 2) Not public but sharable, which the data should be encrypted and be
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decrypted only by authorized users, and 3) Not public and not sharable, which the data should
be decrypted only by the user himself/herself.
As discussed in the survey [14], MANET is an autonomous system of mobile nodes (e.g., smart
mobile devices), which has several salient characteristics, namely, dynamic topologies, bandwidth
constrained and energy constrained operation, and limited physical security. To authenticate the
smart mobile devices in MANETs, Yu et al. [69] introduced the concept of multimodal biometric-
based authentication, which uses a dynamic programming-based HMM scheduling algorithm to
derive the optimal scheme. Therefore, the biosensor scheduling procedure used in the scheme [69]
is based on three steps, namely, 1) Scheduling step, to find the optimal biosensor, 2) Observation
step, to observe the output of the optimal biosensor and 3) Update step, to judge the result of
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the authentication. The scheme [69] is efficient in terms of biosensor costs, but the article fails
to provide a detailed analysis of intrusion detection and encryption. Related to the scheme [69],
Saevanee et al. [54] proposed a continuous user authentication using multi-modal biometrics
with linguistic analysis, keystroke dynamics and behavioral profiling.
Chang et al. [62] proposed the combination of a graphical password with the KDA (Keystroke
Dynamic-based Authentication) system for touchscreen handheld mobile devices. The Chang et
al.’s scheme uses the same three phases as in the KDA systems, namely, 1) Enrollment phase, 2)
Classifier building phase, and 3) Authentication phase. The enrollment phase is launched when
a user’s finger presses the touchscreen of the handheld mobile device at thumbnail photo. The
classifier building phase is used to verify the user’s identity after obtaining the personal features,
which the authors employ a computation-efficient statistical classifier proposed by Boechat et al.
in [92]. In the authentication phase, the classifier is used to verify the user’s identity where the
system compares the sequence of graphical password with the registered one in the enrollment
phase. Through the experiments, the probability of breaking the Chang et al.’s scheme under a
shoulder surfing attack is reduced.
Crawford et al. [49] proposed an extensible transparent authentication framework that inte-
grates multiple behavioral biometrics, namely, keystroke dynamics and speaker verification. The
processes of this framework are based on six phases, namely, 1) Update biometric input buffer, 2)
Update explicit authentication buffer, 3) Compute individual biometric probability, 4) Compute
device confidence, 5) Make task decision, and 6) Update training buffer and refresh classifiers.
Therefore, the idea of capacitive touchscreen to scan body parts is proposed by Holz et al. in
[55]. Specifically, the authors proposed a biometric authentication system, named Bodyprint,
that detects users’ biometric features using the same type of capacitive sensing. The Bodyprint
system is implemented as an application on an LG Nexus 5 phone, which features a Synaptics
ClearPad 3350 touch sensor.
Based on a multimodal recognition of face and iris, De Marsico et al. [76] designed an
authentication application, named FIRME, to be embedded in mobile devices. The FIRME is
made up of separate modules, with a common starting and final processing, and a central part
specialized for each biometrics. The face recognition uses four phases, namely, 1) Acquisition
and segmentation, 2) Spoofing detection, 3) Best template selection, and 4) Feature extraction
and matching. The iris recognition uses two phases, namely, 1) Acquisition and segmentation
and 2) Feature extraction and matching. The question we ask here is: Is it possible to use the
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iris liveness detection for mobile devices under the printed-iris attacks? The study published in
2015 by Gragnaniello et al. in [93] proves that with the local binary pattern descriptor, we can
detect and avoid the printed-iris attacks using the classification through support vector machine
with a linear kernel. Another question we ask here: Is FIRME’s scheme effective for the partial
face detection? The study published in 2016 by Mahbub et al. in [67] proves that with the fewer
facial segment cascade classifiers, we can detect partially cropped and occluded faces captured
using a smartphone’s front-facing camera for continuous authentication.
The idea of a sequence of rhythmic taps/slides on a device screen to unlock the device
is proposed by Chen et al. in [56]. Specifically, the authors proposed a rhythm-based two-
factor authentication, named RhyAuth, for multi-touch mobile devices. The RhyAuth scheme is
implemented as an application on Google Nexus 7 tablets powered by Android 4.2. Note that it
is possible to use another factor as the third authentication factor such as ID/password. However,
the question we ask here is: Is it possible to use four biometric modalities for mobile devices in
order to authenticate the users? The study published in 2017 by Fridman et al. in [91] introduced
the active authentication via four biometric modalities, namely, 1) text entered via soft keyboard,
2) applications used, 3) websites visited, and 4) physical location of the device as determined
from GPS (when outdoors) or WiFi (when indoors).
D. ID-based authentication schemes
The surveyed papers of ID-based schemes for smart mobile devices are shown in Table
VIII. With the application of cryptography in authentication schemes, smart mobile devices
need additional computations, which causes the computation loads and the energy costs of
mobile devices to be very high. To solve this problem, researchers proposed several ID-based
authentication schemes using elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC), as discussed in the work [12].
Therefore, as shown in Figure 9, there are five methods used to provide the authentication
models in ID-based authentication schemes for smart mobile devices, namely, bilinear pairings,
elliptic curve cryptosystem, self-certified public keys, certificateless signature, and homomorphic
encryption.
In order to provide mutual authentication or a session key agreement, Yang and Chang [12]
presented an ID-based remote mutual authentication with key agreement scheme. Specifically,
the scheme is based on three phases, namely, system initialization phase, user registration phase,
and mutual authentication with key agreement phase. Based on the analysis of computational
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and communication costs, the scheme [12] is efficient compared to Jia et al.’s scheme [86]
and can resist outsider, impersonation, and replay attacks. Therefore, Islam and Biswas [38]
have analyzed the disadvantage of Yang and Chang’s scheme [12] and found that is inability
to protect user’s anonymity, known session-specific temporary information attack, and clock
synchronization problem.
Yoon and Yoo’s scheme [29] showed that Yang and Chang’s scheme [12] is vulnerable to
an impersonation attack and does not provide perfect forward secrecy. Similar to both Yang
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and Chang’s scheme [12] and Yoon and Yoo’s scheme [29], Wu and Tseng [30] proposed an
ID-based mutual authentication and key exchange scheme for low-power mobile devices. Using
the random oracle model and under the gap Diffie–Hellman group, Wu and Tseng’s scheme is
secure against an ID attack, impersonation attack, and passive attack. The question we ask here
is: Will resistance to the impersonation attack give the reliability of an authentication scheme
for smart mobile devices? The new study published in 2017 by Spreitzer et al. in [21] proved
that the transition between local attacks and vicinity attacks can be increased under the local
side-channel attacks, especially in case of passive attacks. Thereby, the local side-channel attacks
need to be studied by the authentication schemes for smart mobile devices.
To provide anonymous authentication in mobile pay-TV systems, Sun and Leu [39] pro-
posed an authentication scheme in order to protect the identity privacy. Based on Elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC), the Sun and Leu’s scheme can manipulate authentication parameters and
authorization keys for the multiple requests. Related to the scheme [39], HE et al. [71] proposed
a one-to-many authentication scheme for access control in mobile pay-TV systems. Therefore,
using four mechanisms, namely, symmetrical cryptosystem, asymmetrical cryptosystem, digital
signature and one-way hash function, Chen’s scheme [97] proposed an effective digital right
management scheme for mobile devices. Note that Chang et al. [31] have found that Chen’s
scheme [97] is insecure because an attacker can easily compute the symmetric key, and they
proposed an improved schema based on three phases: the registration phase, the package phase,
and the enhanced authorization phase.
VI. OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
Table IX summarizes the future directions in authentication issues for smart mobile devices.
A. Android malware or malfunctioning smart mobile devices
In 2016 [98, 99], an Android malware succeeded in bypassing the two-factor authentication
scheme of many banking mobile apps. The malware can steal the user’s login credential, including
the SMS verification code. When the legitimate application is launched, the malware is triggered
and a fake login screen overlays the original mobile banking one, with no option to close it. After
that, the user fills in their personal data in the fake app. The key success of this attack is based
on the phishing technique, which displays a graphical user interface (GUI) that has similar visual
features as the legitimate app. The malware can also intercept two-factor authentication code
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(i.e., verification code sent through SMS), and forward it the attacker. One research direction to
prevent this kind of attacks is to detect the apps which have the similar visual appearance and
are installed on the same mobile device.
B. Rethinking authentication on smart mobile devices
Mobile devices are nowadays an essential part of our everyday life and can be integrated with
different types of networks such as IoT, vehicular networks, smart grids, ...etc, as they help the
user accessing the required resources and information of these networks. This integration requires
rethinking the authentication protocols already proposed for mobile devices and considers the
new architecture, the new threats, as well as the implementation feasibility in case of resource-
constrained devices.
C. Developing more robust containers against sophisticated attacks
Employees work very often with their mobile devices by using electronic mail, exchange IM
messages (instant messaging) or view files directly on the cloud through an online cloud storage
application. This means that corporate data is at high risk unless we take the necessary measures
to ensure that data are protected and safe. One solution is to secure files with the use of a secure
container. Containers isolate user’s mobile device and emails are encrypted for protection against
third-party access and attachments to emails open in the container, in order to prevent leakage
to third-party applications. Future research should focus on developing more robust containers
against sophisticated attacks or implementing secure App Wrapping techniques.
D. Securing mobile devices based an unsolvable puzzle
Recently, University of Michigan was funded for producing a computer that is unhackable
[100]. MORPHEUS outlines a new way to design hardware so that information is rapidly and
randomly moved and destroyed. The technology works to elude attackers from the critical
information they need to construct a successful attack. It could protect both hardware and
software. This idea can be the basis for future research for securing mobile devices from attackers.
E. Combined intrusion detection and authentication scheme in smart mobile devices
Intrusion detection capabilities can be built inside the mobile devices in order to spot real-time
malicious behaviors. Such techniques must use combined characteristics and exploit and social
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network analysis techniques [101], in order to cope with zero day attacks and small fluctuations
in user behavior. There are many types of algorithms that may be used to mine audit data on
real time, that can be applied to mobile devices. Data mining based IDSs have demonstrated
higher accuracy, to novel types of intrusion and robust behaviour [102].
F. False data injection attacks in mobile cyber-physical system
False data injection attacks are crucial security threats to the mobile cyber-physical system,
where the attacker can jeopardize the system operations in smart mobile devices. Recently, Li
et al. in [103] proposed a distributed host-based collaborative detection scheme to detect smart
false data injection attacks white low false alarm rate. To identify anomalous measurement data
reported, the proposed scheme employs a set of rule specifications. However, how to identify
and mitigate false data injection attacks in the mobile cyber-physical system? Hence, false data
injection attacks in the mobile cyber-physical system should be exploited in the future.
G. Group authentication and key agreement security under the 5G network architecture
Based on recent advances in wireless and networking technologies such as Software-defined
networking (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV), 5G will enable a fully mobile
and connected society. According to Nguyen et al. [104], the development of network functions
using SDN and NFV will achieve an extremely high data rate. Therefore, a group of smart
mobile devices accessing the 5G network simultaneously causes severe authentication issues. In
a work published in 2018, Ferrag et al. [82] categorized threat models in cellular networks in four
categories, namely, attacks against privacy, attacks against integrity, attacks against availability,
and attacks against authentication. How to achieve mutual authentication by adopting both SDN
and NFV technologies under these threat models? One possible future direction is to develop
a group authentication scheme based on Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) to realize key
forward/backward secrecy.
H. Electrocardiogram-based authentication with privacy preservation for smart mobile devices
Privacy preservation in electrocardiogram-based authentication remains a challenging problem
since adversaries can find different ways of exploiting vulnerabilities of the electrocardiogram
system. Two questions we ask here: How to reduce the acquisition time of Electrocardiogram
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signals for authentication? and how to achieve privacy preservation and electrocardiogram in-
tegrity with differential privacy and fault tolerance? A possible research direction in this topic
could be related to proposing new privacy-preserving aggregation algorithms to resist sensing
data link attack.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we surveyed the state-of-the-art of authentication schemes for smart mobile
devices. Through an extensive research and analysis that was conducted, we were able to classify
the threat models in smart mobile devices into five categories, including, identity-based attacks,
eavesdropping-based attacks, combined eavesdropping and identity-based attacks, manipulation-
based attacks, and service-based attacks. In addition, we were able to classify the countermea-
sures into four types of categories, including, cryptographic functions, personal identification,
classification algorithms, and channel characteristics. Regarding the cryptographic functions, the
surveyed schemes use three types of cryptographic functions, including, asymmetric encryption
function, symmetric encryption function, and hash function.
In order to ensure authentication by the personal identification, the surveyed schemes use two
types, including, 1) biometrics-based countermeasures, which are any human physiological (e.g.,
face, eyes, fingerprints-palm, or ECG) or behavioral (e.g., signature, voice, gait, or keystroke
pattern); 2) numbers-based countermeasures (e.g, Personal Identification Number (PIN), Inter-
national Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI ), and Password). From security analysis perspective,
there are five security analysis techniques used in authentication for smart mobile devices, namely,
computational assumptions, pattern recognition approaches, formal proof, random oracle model,
and game theory.
According to the countermeasure characteristic and the authentication model used, we were
able to classify the surveyed schemes for smart mobile devices in four categories, namely,
biometric-based authentication schemes, channel-based authentication schemes, factor-based au-
thentication schemes, and ID-based authentication schemes. In addition, we presented a side-by-
side comparison in a tabular form for each category, in terms of performance, limitations, and
computational complexity.
There are still exist several challenging research areas (e.g., false data injection attacks in
mobile cyber-physical system, analysis of smart mobile devices under topology attacks, Group au-
thentication and key agreement security under the 5G network architecture, and electrocardiogram-
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based authentication with privacy preservation. . . etc), which can be further investigated in the
near future.
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COUNTERMEASURES USED BY THE AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES FOR SMART MOBILE DEVICES
Countermeasure Scheme
Personal Identification Number (PIN) [47] [48] [49] [46]
Ear Shape [50]
Electrocardiogram [51] [52]
Capacitive touchscreen [53]
Behaviour profiling [54]
Linguistic profiling [54]
Gait recognition [55]
Rhythm [56] [57]
Touch dynamics [58] [43]
Multi-touch interfaces [59] [60]
Probabilistic polynomial time algorithms [25]
Initial random seed number [31]
A unique international mobile equipment identification
number
[31]
Encryption with pairwise master key [40]
Identity-based elliptic curve algorithm [40]
Tag number [28]
Keystroke analysis [47] [48] [61] [62] [49] [63] [54]
[64]
Diffie-Hellman key exchange [26]
Classification algorithms [48] [65] [34] [66] [67]
Chaotic hash [27]
Fingerprint [27] [13] [32] [35] [68]
Teeth image [65]
Voice recognition [65] [49] [46]
HMM biosensor scheduling [69]
Asymmetric encryption function [28]
Symmetric encryption function [28] [34] [31] [45]
Hash function [28] [27] [39] [37] [44] [34] [31]
[38] [13] [70] [33] [35] [71] [72]
[73]
Elliptic curve cryptosystem [12] [29] [39] [38] [13] [72] [73]
Bilinear pairings [30] [39] [44] [70] [33] [42] [71]
Password [37] [34] [62] [45] [46]
Schnorr’s signature scheme [70]
Self-certified public keys [33]
Graphical password [74]
Message authentication code [45]
Channel characteristics [75]
Face recognition [76] [46] [67]
Iris recognition [76] [36]
Certificateless signature [41]
Homomorphic encryption [42] [77]
Order preserving encryption [77]
Gaze gestures [78]
Arm gesture [50]
Signature recognition [79]
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TABLE III
SECURITY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES USED BY THE AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES FOR SMART MOBILE DEVICES
Ref. Time Tool Authentication model Main results
[48] 2007 - Pattern recognition
approaches
- User authentication - Evaluating the feasibility of utilizing keystroke
information in classifying users
[65] 2008 - Pattern recognition
approaches
- User authentication - Evaluating the feasibility of utilizing together
teeth image and voice
[30] 2009 - Random oracle model
- Computational assumptions
- Mutual authentication - Show that the proposed protocol is secure
against ID attack
[39] 2009 - Computational assumptions - Hand-off authentication
- Anonymous authentication
- Show that the proposed scheme can protecting
identity privacy
[44] 2010 - Random oracle model
- Computational assumptions
- Mutual authentication - Show that an adversary should not know the
previous session keys
[58] 2012 - Pattern recognition
approaches
- User authentication - Evaluating the feasibility of touch dynamics
[59] 2012 - Pattern recognition
approaches
- User authentication - Show that the multi-touch gestures great
promise as an authentication mechanism
[60] 2012 - Pattern recognition
approaches
- Continuous mobile authen-
tication
- Evaluating the applicability of using multi-touch
gesture inputs for implicit and continuous user
identification
[70] 2012 - Computational assumptions - Mutual authentication with
key agreement
- Construct an algorithm to solve the CDH prob-
lem or the k-CAA problem
[66] 2013 - Pattern recognition
approaches
- Continuous authentication - Feasibility of continuous touch-based authenti-
cation
[45] 2013 - Formal proof
- Random oracle model
- Transitive authentication - Solving the CDH problem
[41] 2014 - Game theory - Anonymous authentication - Prove that the authentication scheme achieves
anonymity, unlinkability, immunity of key-
escrow, and mutual authentication
[36] 2016 - Pattern recognition
approaches
- Multimodal authentication - Show that the sensor pattern noise-based tech-
nique can be reliably applied on smartphones
[40] 2017 - Pattern recognition
approaches
- Active authentication - Show the performance of each individual clas-
sifier and its contribution to the fused global
decision
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TABLE IV
NOTATIONS USED IN COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL COSTS
Notation Definition
TAR
FAR
FRR
ROC
TPR
FPR
FNR
EER
GAR
Te
Tmul
TH
Tadd
TEadd
TEmul
TE inv
C1
C2
THE
True acceptance rate
False acceptance rate
False rejection rate
Receiver operating characteristic
True-positive rate
False-positive rate
False-negative rate
Equal error rate
Genuine acceptance rate
Ttime of executing a bilinear pairing operation
Time of executing a multiplication operation of
point
Time of executing a one-way hash function
Time of executing an addition operation of points
Time of executing an elliptic curve point addition
Time of executing an elliptic curve point multi-
plication
Time of executing a modular inversion operation
Computational cost of client and server (total)
Computational cost of subscription (total)
Time of encryption and decryption
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TABLE V
BIOMETRIC-BASED AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES FOR SMART MOBILE DEVICES
Time Scheme Method Goal Mobile device Performance (+) and limitation (-) Comp.
complex-
ity
2007 Clarke and
Furnell [47]
- Keystroke
analysis
- Introducing the concept
of advanced user authenti-
cation
- Sony Ericsson
T68;
- HP IPAQ
H5550;
- Sony Clie PEG
NZ90.
+ Keystroke latency
- Process of continuous and non-
intrusive authentication
Low
2007 Clarke and
Furnell [48]
- Keystroke
analysis
- Enable continuous and
transparent identity verifi-
cation
- Nokia 5110 + GRNN has the largest spread of
performances
- The threat model is not defined
High
2008 Khan et al.
[27]
- Fingerprint - Introducing the concept
of chaotic hash-based fin-
gerprint biometrics remote
user authentication scheme
- N/A + Can prevent from fives attacks,
namely, parallel session attack, reflec-
tion attack, Forgery attack, imperson-
ation attack, DoS attack, and server
spoofing attack
- The proposed scheme is not tested
on mobile devices
Low
2010 Li and
Hwang [37]
- Smart card - Providing the non-
repudiation
- N/A + Can prevent from three attacks,
namely, masquerading attacks, replay
attacks, and parallel session attacks
- Storage costs are not considered
10TH
2011 Xi et al. [13] - Fingerprint - Providing the
authentication using
bio-cryptographic
- Mobile device
with Java Plat-
form
+ Secure the genuine biometric fea-
ture
- Server-side attack is not considered
at
FAR=0.1%
,
GAR=78.69%
2012 Chen et al.
[32]
- Fingerprint - Using only hashing func-
tions
- N/A + Solve asynchronous problem
- Privacy-preserving is not considered
7TH
2013 Frank et al.
[66]
-
Touchscreen
- Providing a behavioral
biometric for continuous
authentication
- Google Nexus
One
+ Sufficient to authenticate a user
- Not applicable for long-term authen-
tication
11 to 12
strokes,
EER=2%–
3%
2014 Khan et al.
[35]
- Fingerprint - Improve the Chen et al.’s
scheme and Truong et al.’s
scheme
- N/A + Quick wrong password detection
- Location privacy is not considered
18TH
2015 Hoang et al.
[55]
- Gait recog-
nition
- Employing a fuzzy com-
mitment scheme
- Google Nexus
One
+ Efficient against brute force attacks
- Privacy model is not defined
Low
2016 Arteaga-
Falconi et al.
[51]
- Electrocar-
diogram
- Introducing the con-
cept of electrocardiogram-
based authentication
- AliveCor + Concealing the biometric features
during authentication
- Privacy model is not considered.
TAR=81.82%
and
FAR=1.41%
2017 Abate et al.
[50]
- Ear Shape - Implicitly authenticate
the person authentication
- Samsung
Galaxy S4
smartphone
+ Implicit authentication
- Process of continuous and non-
intrusive authentication
EER=1%–
1.13%
2018 Zhang et al.
[87]
- Iris and pe-
riocular bio-
metrics
- Develop a deep feature
fusion network
- N/A + Requires much fewer storage spaces
- The threat model is limited
EER=
0.60%
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TABLE VI
CHANNEL-BASED AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES FOR SMART MOBILE DEVICES
Time Scheme Method Goal Mobile device Performance (+) and limitation (-) Comp.
complex-
ity
2007 Varshavsky
et al. [26]
- Physical
proximity
- Authenticate co-located
devices
- N/A + Not vulnerable to eavesdropping
- The threat model is limited
High
2008 Li et al. [28] - Electronic
voting
- Introducing the concept
of a deniable electronic
voting authentication in
MANETs
- N/A + Privacy requirement
- Many assumptions needed to under-
stand implementation
Medium
2011 He et al. [25] - Seamless
roaming
- Authenticate with
privacy-preserving
- N/A + Privacy requirement
- The threat model is limited
Medium
2013 Chen et al.
[45]
- Tripartite
authentica-
tion
- Establish a conference
key securely
- Samsung
Galaxy Nexus
+ Transitive authentication
- Intrusion detection is not considered
Medium
2014 Guo et al.
[42]
- Attribute-
based au-
thentication
- Authenticate with
privacy-preserving
- Nexus S + Anonymity and untraceability
- Interest privacy is not considered
High
2015 SETO et al.
[57]
- User-habit-
oriented au-
thentication
- Integrate the habits with
user authentication
- Google Nexus 4 + More usable for people who have
better memory for rhythms than for
geometric curves
- Privacy is not considered
High
2016 Yang et al.
[40]
- Handover
authentica-
tion
- Provides user anonymity
and untraceability
- N/A + Access grant and data integrity
- Many assumptions needed to under-
stand implementation
Medium
2017 Samangouei
et al. [88]
- Attribute-
based au-
thentication
- Introducing the concept
of facial attributes for ac-
tive authentication
- Google Nexus 5 + Implemented with low memory us-
age
- Intrusion detection and encryption
are not considered
Medium
2018 Wu et al.
[89]
- Private key
security
- Provide both secure key
agreement and private key
security
- Samsung
Galaxy S5
+ Perfect forward secrecy
- Intrusion detection is not considered
Low
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TABLE VII
FACTORS-BASED AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES FOR SMART MOBILE DEVICES
Time Scheme Method Goal Mobile device Performance (+) and limitation (-) Comp.
complex-
ity
2008 Kim and
Hong [65]
- Multimodal
biometrics
- Authenticate using teeth
image and voice
- Hp iPAQ
rw6100
+ Better than the performance ob-
tained using teeth or voice individu-
ally
- The threat model is not defined
High
2008 Yu et al. [69] - Multimodal
biometrics
- Introducing the concept
of multimodal biometric-
based authentication in
MANETs
- N/A + Biosensor costs
- Intrusion detection and encryption
are not considered
Medium
2010 Park et al.
[34]
- Multilevel
access
control
- Control all accesses to
the authorized level of
database
- N/A + Flexibility to dynamic access autho-
rization changes
- Many assumptions needed to under-
stand implementation
10TH
2012 Chang et al.
[62]
- Graphical
password
- KDA
system
- Combine a graphical
password with the KDA
system
- Android devices + Suitable for low-power mobile de-
vices
- The threat model is limited
With
thumb-
nails=3,
FRR(%)=7.27,
FAR(%)=5.73
2013 Crawford et
al. [49]
- Keystroke
dynamics
- Speaker
verification
- Integrate multiple behav-
ioral biometrics with con-
ventional authentication
- Android devices + Implement fine-grained access con-
trol
- No suitable for low-power mobile
devices
Medium
2014 Sun et al.
[43]
- Multi-touch
screens
- Authenticate using multi-
touch mobile devices
- Google Nexus 7 + Robust to shoulder-surfing and
smudge attack
- Anonymity problem
TPR=99.3%
FPR=2.2%
2015 Chen et al.
[56]
- Rhythm - Authenticate using the
rhythm for multi-touch
mobile devices
- Google Nexus 7 + More usable for people who have
better memory for rhythms than for
geometric curves
- Privacy is not considered
FPR up to
0.7%
FNR up to
4.2%
2016 Khamis et al.
[78]
- Gaze ges-
tures
- Touch
- Allow passwords with
multiple switches
- Android devices + Secure against side attacks
- The threat model is not defined
Medium
2016 Sitova et al.
[90]
- Hand
movement,
orientation,
and grasp
- Authenticate using the
grasp resistance and grasp
stability
- Android devices + Continuous authentication
- Cross-device interoperability
EER=15.1%
2017 Fridman et
al. [91]
- Four
biometric
modalities
- Introducing the active au-
thentication via four bio-
metric modalities
- Android devices + Active authentication
- User reparability
ERR=5%
FRR
=1,1%
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TABLE VIII
ID-BASED AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES FOR SMART MOBILE DEVICES
Time Scheme Method Goal Mobile
device
Performance (+) and limitation
(-)
Comp. complexity
2009 Yang and
Chang [12]
- Elliptic
curve
cryptosystem
- Providing mutual authen-
tication with key agree-
ment
- N/A + Resist to outsider, imperson-
ation, and replay attacks
- Perfect forward secrecy is not
considered compared to the Yoon
and Yoo’s scheme [29]
3TEmul +2TEadd
2009 Yoon and
Yoo [29]
- Elliptic
curve
cryptosystem
- Providing the perfect for-
ward secrecy
- N/A + Session key security
- Location privacy is not consid-
ered
1TEmul +2TEadd
2009 Wu and
Tseng [30]
- Bilinear
pairings
- Providing the implicit
key confirmation and par-
tial forward secrecy
- N/A + Secure against a passive attack
- The proposed scheme is not
tested on mobile devices
C1 = 2T e + 5Tmul +
8TH +Tadd
2009 Sun and Leu
[39]
- Elliptic
curve
cryptography
- Providing one-to-many
facility
- Mobile
Pay-TV
system
+ Resisting man-in-the-middle at-
tack and replay attack
- Interest privacy is not consid-
ered
C2 = 7T e +8Tmul
2010 Wu and
Tseng [44]
- Bilinear
pairings
- Providing the implicit
key confirmation and par-
tial forward secrecy
- N/A + Secure against ID attack
- The average message delay and
the verification delay are not eval-
uated
C1 = 2T e + 6Tmul +
6TH +2Tadd
2011 Islam and
Biswas [38]
- Elliptic
curve
cryptosystem
- Improve the Yang and
Chang’s scheme [12]
- N/A + Prevents user’s anonymity
problem
- Vulnerable to the ephemeral-
secret-leakage attacks
C1 = 4T add +
8Tmul +7TH
2012 He [70] - Bilinear
pairings
- Providing the key agree-
ment and mutual authenti-
cation
- HiPerS-
mart
+ Provides key agreement
- Perfect forward secrecy is not
considered compared to the Yoon
and Yoo’s scheme [29]
C1 = 2T add +
5Tmul + 4TH +Te +
TE inv
2013 Liao and
Hsiao [33]
- Self-
certified
public keys
- Eliminate the risk of
leaking the master secret
key
- HiPerS-
mart
+ User reparability
- Anonymity problem
C1 = 2T add +
10Tmul +7TH +2T e
2014 Liu et al.
[41]
- Certificate-
less signature
- Avoiding the forgery on
adaptively chosen message
attack
- Windows
CE 5.2 OS
+ Privacy of potential WBAN
users
- The threat model is limited
C1 = 3T e + 2Tmul +
6TH +2Tadd
2015 Shahandashti
et al. [77]
- Homomor-
phic encryp-
tion
- Achieving implicit au-
thentication
- N/A + Secure against maliciously-
controlled devices
- Vulnerable to the replay attack
Medium
2016 Islam and
Khan [72]
- Elliptic
curve
cryptosystem
- Providing the
user anonymity and
unlinkability
- N/A + Resistance to Pohlig–Hellman
attack
- Location privacy is not consid-
ered
C2 = 8TEmul
2017 Wu et al.
[73]
- Elliptic
curve
cryptosystem
- Providing the user
anonymity and privacy-
preserving
- N/A + Perfect forward secrecy
- Vulnerable to the ephemeral-
secret-leakage attacks
C1 = 4TEmul +
11TH
2018 Feng et al.
[94]
- Lattice-
based
anonymous
authentica-
tion
- Implement an anony-
mous authentication for
the postquantum world
- Samsung
GT-I9300
+ Satisfies the identity anonymity
and unlinkability characteristics
- Interest privacy is not consid-
ered
Low
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TABLE IX
SUMMARY OF OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
Challenges Description Focus/Objective Contribution Research opportunities
False data injection at-
tacks in mobile cyber-
physical system
False data injection attacks
jeopardize the system opera-
tions in smart mobile devices
How to identify and miti-
gate false data injection at-
tacks in the mobile cyber-
physical system?
Conventional false
data detection
approaches
- How to evaluate the overall run-
ning status?
- How to design a reputation sys-
tem with an adaptive reputation
updating?
Analysis of smart
mobile devices under
topology attacks
Malicious attacker steals the
topology
How to identify the topol-
ogy attacks and reduce the
amount of stolen informa-
tion
A stochastic Petri net
approach
- How to proof the efficacy of
using a stochastic Petri net ap-
proach ?
- How to prove that Petri nets can
be useful for modeling mobile
cyber-physical system?
Integration of smart
mobile devices using
new generation opti-
cal infrastructure tech-
nologies (NGN)
Integration of smart mobile
devices with different types
of networks such as IoT,
vehicular networks, smart
grids, ...etc.
How the smart mobile de-
vices are able to mu-
tually authenticate with
NGN without any signifi-
cant increase in overheads
?
An energy-aware en-
cryption for smart mo-
bile devices in In-
ternet of Multimedia
Things
- How to integrate smart mobile
devices into NGN ?
- How to design an authentication
scheme that reduces the costs in
terms of storage cost, computa-
tion complexity, communication
overhead, and delay overhead?
Android malware or
malfunctioning smart
mobile devices
Malicious or malfunctioning
smart mobile devices can be
the source of data
How to safeguard data
against such attacks?
An efficient end-to-
end security and en-
crypted data scheme
- The choice of encryption is a
challenge in view of power com-
plexities of smart mobile devices
Anonymous profile
matching
Malicious or malfunctioning
smart mobile devices iden-
tify a user who has the same
profiles
How to provides the con-
ditional anonymity ?
Prediction-based
adaptive pseudonym
change strategy
- How to keeps the service over-
head of mobile devices very low?
- How to achieve the confidential-
ity of user profiles?
- How to resist against the false
data injection from the external
attacks ?
Group authentication
and key agreement se-
curity under the 5G
network architecture
A group of smart mobile de-
vices accessing the 5G net-
work simultaneously cause
severe authentication issues
Rethinking the authentica-
tion and key agreement
protocols in 3G/LTE net-
works
A group
authentication scheme
based on Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) to realize
key forward/backward
secrecy
- How to provide privacy and key
forward/backward secrecy?
- How to resist the exist-
ing attacks including redirection,
man-in-the-middle, and denial-
of-service attacks, etc.
Electrocardiogram-
based authentication
with privacy
preservation for
smart mobile devices
Privacy preservation in
electrocardiogram-based
authentication remains
a challenging problem
since adversaries can find
different ways of exploiting
vulnerabilities of the
electrocardiogram system
- How to reduce the
acquisition time of
Electrocardiogram signals
for authentication ?
- How to achieve
privacy preservation
and electrocardiogram
integrity with differential
privacy and fault
tolerance?
- Proposing new
privacy-preserving
aggregation
algorithms
- Proposing a new
secure handover
session key
management scheme
- How to resist sensing data link
attack?
- How to achieve scalability
by performing aggregation oper-
ations ?
- How to improve the TAR and
FAR using deep learning?
Authentication for
smart mobile devices
using Software-
defined networking
(SDN) and network
function virtualization
(NFV)
The development of network
functions using SDN/NFV
remains a challenging prob-
lem since mobile malware
can disrupt the operation of
the protocols between the
control and data planes, e.g.,
OpenFlow [95] and ForCES
[96]
- How to achieve mutual
authentication by adopting
both SDN and NFV tech-
nologies?
- Proposing new pri-
vate data aggregation
scheme for authenti-
cation
- How to secure against malware
attack?
- How to achieve the computation
efficiency?
